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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ARMAND WALLJASPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20110291 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On February 28, 2011, the trial court imposed sentences on two of Walljasper's 
previously entered pleas in abeyance. The Defendant/Appellant timely appealed the 
sentences imposed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (Supp. 2010). The original Sentence, Judgment and Commitment is in Addendum 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court violated the defendant's right of allocution as protected by 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) when it failed to allow the defendant to allocute 
before pronouncing sentence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue involves a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Brown v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, Tf 15, 16 P.3d 540 ("[T]he inteipretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law that we review for correctness."). 
CONTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes and rules are in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2010); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Walljasper was charged in two separate cases of Violations of a Protective Order, 
class A misdemeanors, in violation of UCA §76-5-108. R. 1-2. The defendant later pled 
guilty on August 12, 2009, and the defendant's pleas were held in abeyance pursuant to a 
plea agreement. R. 31A-32. An Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause was 
subsequently filed on November 16, 2009, alleging that the defendant had violated the terms 
of the plea in abeyance agreement. On February 28, 2011, Walljasper admitted to having 
violated the terms of his plea in abeyance agreement. R. 56 at 3; R. 50. The court entered 
the pleas as class A misdemeanors and proceeded to sentence the defendant. R. 56 at 13; R. 
50-51. 
2 
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Before imposing sentence, the court heard from defense counsel, the victim, and the 
prosecutor. R. 56. The court did not, however, ask the defendant if he wished to address the 
court before pronouncing sentence. Near the end of the imposition of sentence, defense 
counsel informed the court that his client wished to allocute, to which the court replied, "Let 
me just finish this, though." R. 56 at 14. The court subsequently permitted the defendant to 
allocute, though it made no remark regarding the allocution and simply completed imposing 
the conditions of probation upon the defendant. R. 56 at 14-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 28,2011, Walljasper admitted to having violated the terms of his plea in 
abeyance agreement. R. 56 at 3; R. 50. The court entered the pleas as class A misdemeanors 
and proceeded to sentence the defendant. R. 56 at 13; R. 50-51. After hearing from the 
victim, defense counsel, and the prosecution, the judge proceeded to sentence the defendant. 
R. 56 at 13. The court imposed 60 days of additional jail time, and then placed the defendant 
on probation. R. 56 at 13. When the court asked counsel who was supervising the defendant 
in his other case, the following exchange took place: 
MR. DELICINO [defense counsel]: I believe it will be AP&P. And, Judge, just for 
the record, I think Mr. Walljasper would like to allocute, if that's possible. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
3 
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MR. DELICINO: He'd like to allocute. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELICINO: He'd like to address the Court, if that's possible. 
THE COURT: Let me just finish this, though. 
Id. at 14. After indicating that Walljasper's probation was to be supervised by Adult 
Probation and Parole, the court then allowed Walljasper to speak before setting forth the 
remaining terms of probation. Id. Following Walljasper's allocution, the court immediately 
returned to the terms of probation, failing to address any of Walljasper's comments. Id. at 
16. Once the defendant had finished speaking, the court completed its sentencing, noting: 
THE COURT: The probation will be supervised, as I indicated, by Adult 
Probation and Parole, it will last for a period of 18 months. And any additional 
temis and conditions that Adult Probation and Parole may require for purposes 
of completion of his probation will be part of the probation order. 
R.56atl6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it sentenced Walljasper before complying with his right to 
allocute. The court allowed defense counsel, the victim, and the prosecutor to address the 
court before imposing sentence, but extended no such opportunity to Walljasper himself. 
Only after defense counsel advised the court that his client would like to address the court did 
the judge permit allocution. By that time, however, the court had already imposed sentence. 
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In addition, the trial judge failed to take the proper steps to cure his error once the 
failure to comply with the right of allocution became known. Instead, the trial court insisted 
on pronouncing sentence before allowing Walljasper to allocute. Further, the trial court 
made no affirmative effort to re-open the proceedings or to otherwise assure Walljasper his 
allocution could impact the sentence. Lastly, the trial court did not acknowledge 
Walljasper's remarks in any fashion and simply imposed the remaining conditio-ns of 
probation without revisiting the sentence that had already been imposed. Given the 
circumstances surrounding the sentencing, the trial court's failure constitutes a clear violation 
of Rule 22(a) and should require the sentence to be vacated in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED WALLJASPER'S RIGHT TO 
ALLOCUTE BY PRONOUNCING SENTENCE BEFORE ALLOWING 
WALLJASPER TO SPEAK. 
As one federal judge has observed, the right of allocution "reaffirms human 
dignity in the face of severe punishment." D. Brock Hornby, Speaking in Sentences, 14 
Green Bag 2d 147, 154 (2011). It is thus unsurprising that u[a]s early as 1689, it was 
recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before 
sentence was imposed required reversal." Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 
(1961) (citing Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 Eng.Rep. 175 (K.B.)). Courts and 
5 
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commentators alike have recognized the importance of allocution in our criminal justice 
system. See, e.g. United States v. Alba-Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(defendant allocution "both a rite and a right"); United States v. Garcia-Robles, 640 F.3d 
159, 165 (6th Cir. 2011) (defendant's right to allocute is "of the utmost importance"); 
United States v. Noel 581 F.3d 490, 508 (7th Cir. 2011) (in dissent) ("the importance of 
the right to allocute cannot be minimized").1 Indeed, Justice Douglas himself noted that 
"the right to be heard is often vital at the sentencing stage before the law decides the 
punishment of the person found guilty." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 237 
(1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
The recognized purposes of the right to allocute are manifold. One court has noted 
that the purpose of the right is "to temper punishment with mercy in appropriate cases, 
and to ensure that sentencing reflects individualized circumstances." United States v. 
Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other grounds) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Another circuit has explicitly commented on the 
salutary benefits to the public at large of the right of allocution. The Tenth Circuit 
remarked that: 
1 See also Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1449, 1450 (2005) (recognizing allocution carries a "personal, dignitary, 
and democratic import beyond its instrumental role with the criminal case"); Kimberly A. 
Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2641, 
2643 (2007) (allocution important for "mitigation and humanization"). 
6 
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Providing a defendant with a meaningful opportunity to speak on his own behalf 
advances the public perception of fairness. Consequently, a sentencing court 
undermines its own legitimacy when it invites a defendant to speak only after 
making clear that his sentence is a foregone conclusion. 
United States v. Landeros-Lopez 615 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
In a footnote in the Landeros-Lopez decision, the Tenth Circuit provided additional 
analysis of the benefits of allocution. As the court observed, 
We note that there are additional benefits to defendant allocution. It gives the 
defendant an opportunity to apologize and express remorse, supplies a forum in 
which defendants may challenge societal injustice, and may provide answers to 
victims' questions regarding the crime. 
Id. at n.7.3 
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "codifies the common-law 
right of allocution, allowing a defendant to make a statement in mitigation or explanation 
after conviction but before sentencing." State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f l 8 , 79 P.3d 937 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). As the Rule expressly provides: 
2 See also United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7m Cir. 1991) (citing the AB;A 
Standards for Criminal Justice and noting that "[a]side from its practical role in 
sentencing, the right [of allocution] has value in terms of 'maximizing the perceived 
equity of the process."'). 
3 The Seventh Circuit noted that the "right of allocution allows a defendant to personally 
address the court before sentencing in an attempt to mitigate punishment. With historical 
roots in the common law, the opportunity to plead for mercy is another provision in a 
procedural body of law designed to enable our system of justice to mete out punishment in 
the most equitable fashion possible, to help ensure that sentencing is particularized and 
reflects individual circumstances. United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7n Cir. 1991). 
7 
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Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to 
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). Section 77-18-1 reiterates the right of 
allocution, dictating that: 
"At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be 
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (Supp. 2010). 
Compliance with the right of allocution requires the trial court to provide "the 
defendant personally with an opportunity to address the court." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 
1flfl9, 23. "[T]here are times, such as allocution, where the voice of the individual 
defendant is most appropriate in the presentation of a personal plea." Id. at [^18 (citing 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354-55 (Utah 1993)); Green, 365 U.S. at 304 ("The most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with 
halting eloquence, speak for himself.").4 Thus, the trial court is required at the time of 
sentencing "to affirmatively provide the defense"—meaning the defendant and his 
4 Additionally, the right of allocution safeguards due process rights by "ensuring] that 
the judge is provided with reasonably reliable and relevant information regarding 
sentencing." Wanos|k, 2003 UT 46 at \\9 (citing State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115,118 
(Utah 1985) ("The due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.")). 
8 
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attorney—"an opportunity to address the court and present reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence. A simple verbal invitation or 
question will suffice, but it is the court which is responsible for raising the matter." 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^ {23; see United States v. Byars, 290 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1961) 
("The defendant, himself, must be given such opportunity and some conduct of the court 
must let the defendant know that he, as well as counsel, has this right.")- Significantly, 
the right to allocute must be furnished to the defendant before the sentence is pronounced. 
As the Supreme Court in Green observed, 
Trial judges before sentencing should, as a matter of good judicial administration, 
unambiguously address themselves to the defendant. Hereafter trial judges should 
leave no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to 
speak prior to sentencing. 
365 U.S. at 655 (emphases added). 
In this case, it is clear that the sentencing judge failed to provide Walljasper with 
an opportunity to allocute before sentence was imposed. After hearing from the victim, 
defense counsel, and the prosecution, the judge proceeded to sentence the defendant. R. 
56 at 13. When it appeared that the court had failed to provide the defendant with a 
timely opportunity to allocute, the following exchange took place. 
MR. DELICINO [defense counsel]: ... And, Judge, just for the record, I think Mr. 
Walljasper would like to allocute, if that's possible. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
9 
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MR. DELICINO: He'd like to allocute. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DELICINO: He'd like to address the Court, if that's possible. 
THE COURT: Let me just finish this, though. 
Id. at 14. After indicating that Walljasper's probation was to be supervised by Adult 
Probation and Parole, the court then allowed Walljasper to speak before setting forth 
some of the terms of probation. Id. Following Walljasper's allocution, the court 
immediately returned to the terms of probation, failing to address any of Walljasper's 
comments. Id. at 16. 
It is clear that the sentencing judge violated Walljasper's right of allocution. 
Though the court heard from the victim, defense counsel and the prosecutor, the court 
never addressed the defendant regarding his right of allocution. In fact, it was only after 
defense counsel reminded the court that his client would like to allocute that the court 
recognized this right. The error was brought to the court's attention after the court had 
already effectively pronounced sentence, and the court still went forward, telling counsel, 
"Let me just finish this [the sentence], though." Id. at 14. Not only did the judge's 
actions fail to comport with the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Green, but his actions contravened the requirements of Utah R. d im. P 22(a). 
10 
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Because of the court's failure to provide the defendant with an opportunity to allocute 
before sentence was pronounced, the sentence must be vacated and re-sentencing ordered. 
IL THE COURT FAILED TO REMEDY ITS ERROR BY PERMITTING A 
BELATED ALLOCUTION WHERE IT TOOK NO AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION TO ADDRESS ITS OVERSIGHT. 
Where a trial court initially deprives the defendant of his right to allocution, it is 
not enough to remedy this failure by allowing the defendant to allocute after sentence has 
been pronounced. See, e.g., Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1267-1268 (right of allocution 
unfulfilled when "a sentencing court adjudges a sentence prior to allocution"); United 
States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1991) (remanding case in which defendant granted 
opportunity to speak after sentence determination); United States v. Byars, 290 F.2d 515 
(6th Cir. 1961) (same). Indeed, "to address the court after sentencing does not serve the 
purpose underlying the rule." Barnes, 948 F.2d at 331. Although some courts have 
recognized that a court may "cure" its previous error or oversight, the record must 
generally reflect a clear indication that the judge recognized his or her error and assured 
the defendant that the sentence would be re-considered. United States v. Luepke, 495 
F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2007). Absent such assurances, a belated right to allocution is 
insufficient and thus constitutes error. Id.; see also Pelaez, 930 F.2d at 524 (rejecting 
government's argument that court's oversight in allocution was cured by belated 
11 
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invitation to allocute as "the court had no intention of reconsidering the sentence and 
defendant's right of allocution was thus effectively denied.")-5 
In Luepke, the sentencing judge announced a sentencing range and "called upon 
counsel for those comments as it relates to that sentence to be imposed." 495 F.3d at 445. 
The court considered defense counsel's comments and "[wjithout further presentations 
from counsel and without inviting any comment from [the defendant] about the 
appropriate sentence," the court stated the sentence and detailed the terms of confinement 
and supervised release. Id. Despite announcing the sentence in "seemingly conclusive 
terms/' the court gave the defendant the opportunity to address the court "before imposing 
sentence." Id. (emphasis in original). The court heard from the defendant and noted that 
"the Court does impose that sentence as previously announced." Id. 
The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court's actions effectively 
denied "him the right to meaningful allocution." Id. at 445-46. The panel in Luepke first 
noted that the rule governing allocution "did not intend to place on the defendant the 
burden of changing the judge's mind after the judge had reached a firm decision[.]" Id. at 
447. The court further observed that addressing the judge after sentencing does not serve 
5 Cf. United States v. Griffin, 530 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008). The court in Griffin 
held that adequate corrective steps were taken where the district court genuinely 
reconsidered the sentence and "promptly conceded its error, invited Griffin to speak, and 
ultimately engaged in a dialogue with him and asked several questions of the defendant." 
Id. 
12 
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the purpose of the rule. While the Luepke court noted the possibility that the sentencing 
judge could attempt to rectify his or her failure to safeguard the right of allocution, the 
court set forth a narrow range of circumstances where the court's failure might be 
excused. As the court noted, 
[A] trial judge, realizing after sentencing that the right of allocution has been 
neglected, may rectify the situation by, in effect, setting aside the sentence, 
reopening the proceeding, and inviting the defendant to speak, [citations omitted] 
Under this approach, the trial court must genuinely reconsider the sentence in light 
of the elicited statement. 
Id. at 448 (citing Barnes, 948 F.2d at 331 n.5). 
Given the sentencing court's failure, the court in Luepke held that "the district 
court's belated invitation to Mr. Luepke to speak after the announcement of the sentence 
[did not] alter[], in any significant way, the detriment to the defendant from the court's 
earlier error." Id. at 450. Because it was not apparent that the trial court "genuinely 
reconsidered] the sentence in light of the elicited statement," the failure to permit timely 
allocution was error. Id. As the panel in Luepke held, "the district court erred in 
announcing a definitive sentence without first inviting Mr. Luepke to speak. We also 
conclude that the district court's later invitation to speak cannot be characterized as an 
adequate repair of the damage." Id.6 
6 See also Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1266 ("Belatedly inviting the defendant to speak 
after announcing his sentence does not satisfy" the rules governing allocution). 
13 
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i 
In this case, the court took no affirmative steps to ensure the defendant that it < 
would reconsider the sentence already imposed. Indeed, the court offered no assurance to 
the defendant that it would duly consider his statement in its sentence, nor did the court 
i 
offer any comment whatsoever following the defendant's statement. After the defendant 
allocuted, the court directly proceeded to finish imposing the conditions of probation with 
nary an acknowledgment of the defendant's remarks. See United States v. Gonzalez, 529 
F.3d 94, 97 (2nc Cir. 2008) (considering whether a sentencing court "gave the defendant's 
statements full consideration, and responded by giving reasons for his decision to adhere , 
to the previously announced sentence"); United States v. Feng Li, 115 F.3d 125, 133 (2nd 
Cir. 1997) (rule governing allocution "demands that each defendant be allowed a 
meaningful right to express relevant mitigating information before an attentive and 
receptive district judge"). While it is clear that a court may "cure" its initial oversight, 
errors cannot be cured by merely affording the defendant the right to speak when it will 
have no bearing on the court's sentence. Such an approach effectively renders inert the 
"anciently recognized right of a defendant to speak to the court before sentence is 
imposed." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 434 (1962). 
CONCLUSION 
The sentence of the district court should be vacated and the case remanded for 
resentencing because of the court's violation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). 
14 
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,th DATED this 12m day of October, 2011. 
M. DELICINO 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered on 
this 12th day of October, 2011, to: 
Ryan D. Robinson 
West Valley City Attorney 
3600 Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
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ARMAND WALLJASPER, 
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Addendum A 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARMAND WALLJASPER, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 091900728 MO 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Date: February 28, 2011 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: ROBINSON, RYAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELICINO, JEREMY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 24, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: 1:31 
This case involves domestic violence. 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/28/2011 Guilty 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for an order to 
show cause. Defendant admits allegations 1 and 2. Based on 
defendant's admissions, the Court finds defendant in violation of 
probation and probation is revoked. 
The Court enters the plea in this case. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
ARMAND ALEJANDRO WALLJASPER 
ARMOND WALJASPER 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 305 
day(s). 
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Case No: 091900728 Date: Feb 28, 2011 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This case is concurrent to any other sentence. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 60 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to comply with any treatment and conditions 
recommended by APPD. ~fX'~yXk 
Date: X% ^Vxv^^n \ ^^f^^5^^ 
| RANDALL 'si^SH^ ~ 
District Court Judge , 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
Utah R. Cnm. P. 22(a) 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 
days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also 
be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
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